If set to "@saved" the chosen entry will be saved as an EFI variable on every boot and automatically selected the next time the boot loader starts.

Table 1. Automatically detected entries will use the following names:

Supported glob wildcard patterns are
"?", "*", and "[...]" (including ranges). Note that these patterns use the same syntax as glob(7), but do not support all features. In particular, set negation and named character classes are not supported. The matching is done case-insensitively on the entry ID (as shown by bootctl list).

Added in version 239.

If set to "menu-disabled" or "menu-hidden" or "0" (the default), no menu is shown and the default entry will be booted immediately. Unless "menu-disabled" is used, the menu can be shown by pressing and holding a key before systemd-boot is launched. Setting this to "menu-force" disables the timeout while always showing the menu.

Added in version 239.

Takes a number or one of the special values listed below. The following values may be used:

0

1

2

auto

max

keep

Added in version 239.

Added in version 239.

Added in version 239.

Added in version 239.

Added in version 251.

Controls enrollment of secure boot keys found on the ESP if the system is in setup mode:

off

manual

if-safe

force

The different sets of variables can be set up under /loader/keys/NAME where NAME is the name that is going to be used as the name of the entry. This allows one to ship multiple sets of Secure Boot variables and choose which one to enroll at runtime.

Supported Secure Boot variables are one database for authorized images, one for the key exchange key (KEK) and one for the platform key (PK). For more information, refer to the UEFI specification[2], under Secure Boot and Driver Signing. Another resource that describe the interplay of the different variables is the EDK2 documentation[3].

A complete set of UEFI variable includes db.auth, KEK.auth and PK.auth. Note that these files need to be authenticated UEFI variables. See below for an example of how to generate them from regular X.509 keys.

uuid=$(systemd-id128 new --uuid)
for key in PK KEK db; do
  openssl req -new -x509 -subj "/CN=${key}/" -keyout "${key}.key" -out "${key}.pem"
  openssl x509 -outform DER -in "${key}.pem" -out "${key}.der"
  sbsiglist --owner "${uuid}" --type x509 --output "${key}.esl" "${key}.der"
done
# See also: Windows Secure Boot Key Creation and Management Guidance[4]
curl --location \
     "https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?linkid=321192" -o ms-db-2011.der \
     "https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?linkid=321185" -o ms-kek-2011.der \
     "https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?linkid=321194" -o ms-uefi-db-2011.der \
     "https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?linkid=2239776" -o ms-db-2023.der \
     "https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?linkid=2239775" -o ms-kek-2023.der \
     "https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?linkid=2239872" -o ms-uefi-db-2023.der
sha1sum -c <<END
580a6f4cc4e4b669b9ebdc1b2b3e087b80d0678d  ms-db-2011.der
31590bfd89c9d74ed087dfac66334b3931254b30  ms-kek-2011.der
46def63b5ce61cf8ba0de2e6639c1019d0ed14f3  ms-uefi-db-2011.der
45a0fa32604773c82433c3b7d59e7466b3ac0c67  ms-db-2023.der
459ab6fb5e284d272d5e3e6abc8ed663829d632b  ms-kek-2023.der
b5eeb4a6706048073f0ed296e7f580a790b59eaa  ms-uefi-db-2023.der
END
for key in ms-*.der; do
  sbsiglist --owner 77fa9abd-0359-4d32-bd60-28f4e78f784b --type x509 --output "${key%der}esl" "${key}"
done
# Optionally add Microsoft Windows certificates (needed to boot into Windows).
cat ms-db-*.esl >>db.esl
# Optionally add Microsoft UEFI certificates for firmware drivers / option ROMs and third-party
# boot loaders (including shim). This is highly recommended on real hardware as not including this
# may soft-brick your device (see next paragraph).
cat ms-uefi-*.esl >>db.esl
# Optionally add Microsoft KEK certificates. Recommended if either of the Microsoft keys is used as
# the official UEFI revocation database is signed with this key. The revocation database can be
# updated with fwupdmgr(1).
cat ms-kek-*.esl >>KEK.esl
attr=NON_VOLATILE,RUNTIME_ACCESS,BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS
sbvarsign --attr "${attr}" --key PK.key --cert PK.pem --output PK.auth PK PK.esl
sbvarsign --attr "${attr}" --key PK.key --cert PK.pem --output KEK.auth KEK KEK.esl
sbvarsign --attr "${attr}" --key KEK.key --cert KEK.pem --output db.auth db db.esl

This feature is considered dangerous because even if all the required files are signed with the keys being loaded, some files necessary for the system to function properly still won't be. This is especially the case with Option ROMs (e.g. for storage controllers or graphics cards). See Secure Boot and Option ROMs[5] for more details.

Added in version 252.

Work around BitLocker requiring a recovery key when the boot loader was updated (disabled by default).

Try to detect BitLocker encrypted drives along with an active TPM. If both are found and Windows Boot Manager is selected in the boot menu, set the "BootNext" EFI variable and restart the system. The firmware will then start Windows Boot Manager directly, leaving the TPM PCRs in expected states so that Windows can unseal the encryption key. This allows systemd-boot(7) to be updated without having to provide the recovery key for BitLocker drive unlocking.

Note that the PCRs that Windows uses can be configured with the "Configure TPM platform validation profile for native UEFI firmware configurations" group policy under "Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\BitLocker Drive Encryption". When Secure Boot is enabled, changing this to PCRs "0,2,7,11" should be safe. The TPM key protector needs to be removed and then added back for the PCRs on an already encrypted drive to change. If PCR 4 is not measured, this setting can be disabled to speed up booting into Windows.

Added in version 251.

# /boot/efi/loader/loader.conf
timeout 0
default 01234567890abcdef1234567890abdf0-*
editor no